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American legislation on patents for inventions is based
on the first article of the Constitution. Section 8
declares that Conqress shall have power "to promote the
progress of science and useful arts,by securing for lim-
ited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveriesw The sub-
ject is now regulated by sections 4883 to 4928 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States.
It is provided bV section 4886 of the Revised Stat-
utes that: 'Any person who has invented or discovered any
new and useful artmachine,manufacture or composition of
matteror anV new and useful improvement thereof,not
known or used b, others in this country, and not patented
or described in anv printed publication in this or any
foreign countrybefore his invention or discovery thereofI
and -not in public use or on sale for more than two years
prior to his application,unless the same is proved to
have been abandoned.,nay, upon payvment of the fees required
by law, and other due proceedings had,obtain a patent
therefore"
Any one who understands each and every part of the
foregoing section,as it is construed by the courts,hias a
good knowledge of a large part of the American patent law,
It is highly improbable that the Binlish language con-
tains another collocation of the same number of words upon
the construction and interpretation of which there has
been lavished a like amount of skill,research,and learn-
ing.
It will be observed that the statute does not
merely require that the subject matter of a patent should
be newbut it must be i~ivented or discovered. As to what
invention really is has taxed the courts ever since the
passage of the patent acts. The various writers on patent
law have ventured different definitions. Simonds says:
uInvention implies the exercise of a creative faculty in
mindas distinguished from the exercise of the judgment
supposed to be possessed by persons skilled in the par-
ticular art to which the subject matter relates. "A more
scientific definition is given by Robinson in the follow-
ing language., Every invention contains two elements:,
(1) An idea conceived by the inventor; (2)An application
of that idea to the production of a practical result.
Neither of these elements is alone sufficient. An unap-
plied idea is not an invention. The application of an
idea,not origlinal with the person who applies it,is not
invention. }Ience,the inventive act in reality consists of
two acts; one mental,the conceptidn of an idea; the other
rnanual,the reduction of thiat idea to practice. "
Some writers and judges maintain that for the pur-
poses of the law invention and discovery are synonymous
termss.HRowever,it is a matter of little practical impor-
tance whether the view that there is a clear distinction
between invention and discoverV is adoptedor whether the
opposite view prevails. The latter is forcibly stated in
Walker on Patents,section 2,as follows:"The Word dis-cov-
ery does not haveeither in the Constitution or the stat-
uteits broadest siqnification. It means invention in
those documents,and in them it means nothing else. The
discoveries of inventors are inventions. The same man may
invent a rachineand may discover an island or a law of
nature. For doing the first of these things,the patent
laws will reward himnbecause he is an inventor in doing
it; but those laws cannot reward him for doing either of
the othersbecause he is not an inventor in doing either.
The statutes provide that patents may be granted for four
classes of things. These are arts,machinesmanufactures,
and composition.s of rnatter.None of these things can be
originally made known by discovery,as our continent was.
They are not found,but are created. They are results of
original thought. They are inventions. Laws of nature,on
the other haind,can never be invented by man,thougbh they
may be discovered by him.When discovered,they may be util
ized by means of an art,a machinea manufacture,or a com-
position of matter.It is the invention of one or more of
thesefor the purpose of utilizinq a law of nature,and
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not the discovery of that lawthat may be rewarded with a
patent.4
A person is not entitled to a patent for any pos-
sible process or contrivance which he may invent,-usin
the word invent in the sense indicated in the foregoing
paragraph. In order to be patentable,the subject matter
must embody the followingr requisites:(1)The proper sub-
ject of a patent; (2)Invention; (3)Novelty; (4)Utility.
It is to the second of these characteristics of a
patentable inventionthat the writer will devote his at-
tention in this thesis.
The rule as to what constitutes invention has vari-
ed at different periods in the history of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
In the case of Earle v. Sawyer,4 Mason 1,(1825),
Note. The above division was first declared by Mr. Walker
in his text-book on the Law of Patents,the first edition
of which appeared in 1888. Previous writers did not entun-
eratewinventionu as one of the essentials of patentability.
The division being stated for the first time in a text-
Sbook, it naturally enough was rather scouted at first by
some prominent patent jurists,but gradually it conmmenced
to be applied by the courts,until today it is gfenerally
accepted as the correct and only satisfactorV classifica-
tion.
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Justice Story laid down a rule on this subject which is at
once simplepractical and easily understood. ,,eviewing the
doctrine contended for by the defendant,he says:
"The whole argumentupon which this doctrine is at-
tempted to be sustained,is to this effect. It is not suffi-
cient that a thing is new and usefulto entitle the author
of it to a patent.le must do more.He must find it out bV
mental labor and intellectual creation.If the result of ac-
cidentit must be what would not occur to all persons
skilled in the artwho wished to produce the same result.
There must be some addition to the common stock of knowl-
edgeand not merely the first use of what was known before.
The patent act gives a reward for the communication of that
which might be otherwise withholden.An invention is the
finding out of some effort of the understanding.The mere
putting of two things together,although never done before,
is no invention.
It did not appear to me at the trialand does not
appear to me now,that this mode of reasoning upon the meta-
physical nature,or the abstract definition of an invention,
can justly be applied to cases under the patent act. That
act proceeds upon. the langua~ge of common sense and common
life,has nothing mysterious or equivocal about it. The
first section enacts that when any person, etc.,shall allege
that he ha"s invented any neijT and useful artmachinemanu-
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facture or composition of matter,n! known or used before
the applicationetc.,it shall be lawful for the Secretary
of State to cause letters pateut to be made out,etc.,
granting the exclusive right and liberty of making,con-
structing,usinq and vending to others to be usedthe said
invention or discovery,"etc. The thing to be patented is
not a mere elementary principle or intellectual discovery,
but a principle put in practiceand applied to some art,
machine,or composition of -matter.It must be new and not
known or used before the application:that isthe party
must have found outcreate or constructed some artmachine
etc.,or some improvement on some artmachineetc.,which
had not been previously found out,created or constructed
by any other person.It is of no consequence whether the
thing be simple or complicated;whether it be by accident
or long labored thoughtor by an instantaneous flash of
mind that it is first done.The law looks to the factand
not to the process by which it is accomplished. It gives
the first inventor or discoverer of the thing the exclus-
ive right,and asks nothing as to the extent or mode of the
application of his genius to conceive or execute it.It
must also be useful,it must not be noxious or mischievous,
but capable of being applied to good purposes; and perhaps
it may also be a just interpretation of the law, tbat it
meant to exclude things absolutely frivolous or foolish.
But the degree of positive utilitV is less important in
the eve of the law than some other things,though in re.gard
to the inventoras a measure of the value of his invention
it is of the highest irhportaiice.
The first questioon,then to be asked in cases of
this nature is whether the thing has been done before. In
case of a machine,whether it has been substantially. con-
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structed before;in case of an improvement of a machine,
whether that improvement has ever been applied to such a
machine beforeor whether it is substantially a new com-
bination. If it is new,.if it is uiseful,if it has not been
known or used before,it constitutes an inveTntion within
the very terms of the actandin my judqment,withlin the
verV sense and intendment of the Legislature. I am utterly
at a loss to give any other interpretation to the actland,
indeed,in the attempt to make that more clear which is ex-
pressed in unambiguous terms in the law itself,there is
danger of creating an artificial obscurity,'
From this clearly stated test for determining the
presence or absence of iuIventi.on,the courts,however,grad-
nallyv departed. They were inclined to make inquiryz in each
case as to the nature of the mental procev.s reiuired to
produce the subject matter.The culmination o.f this depar-
ture was reached in Pearce v. Mulfort, 102 P.8.I12 (1880),
where it was laid down that "All improvement is not invention
and entitled to protection as snch.Thus to entitle it,it
must be the product of some exercise of the inventive
faculties,and it must involve something more than what is
obvious to persons skilled in the art to which it relates."
Within a decade from the announcement of the decis-
ion in Pearce v. Mulfordthe Supreme Court swung around
to the early test of Justice Story,thus completely chang-
ingT its position. The modern rulethenis stated by Jus-
tice Brown in Mc Clain v. Ortmayer,141 U.8.419.,426,in the
following language,
"By some invention is described as the contriving
or constructing of that which had not before existed; and
bv anothergiving a construction to the patent lawas
"the finding outcontrivingdevising or creating something
new and usefulwhichi did not exist beforeby an operation
of the intellect.'To say thapt the act of invention is the
production of something new and useful does not solve the
difficulty of giving an accurate definitionsince the ques-
tion of what is new as distinguished firom that which is a
colorable variation of vwhat is old,is usua,l1.y the very
question in issue. To sayv that i t involves an operation
of the intellect,is a product of intuition or of something
akin to genius,as distinguisli.ci from mere mechanical skill,
draws one somewhat nearer to an appreciation of the true
distinctionbut it does not adequately express the idea.
The truth is the word cannot be defined in such manner as
afford any substa--tial ado in determining whether a par-
ticular device involves an exercise of the inventive fac-
ulty- or not. In a given cas(, we may be able to say that
there is present invention of' a very high orber. In anotheT
we can se that there is lackirng that impalpable somnthing
which distinguishes invention from simple mechanical skill
Cou rtsadoptiig fixed principles as a guide,have by a pro-
cess of exclusion determined that certain variations in
old devices do or do not involve invention; but whether the
variation relied upon in a particular case is anything
more than ordinarV mechanical skill is a question which
cannot be answered bV applying the test of any .general
definition.z"
In accordance with the above suggested methodwhich
Mr. Walker very aptly calls, udia.nosis by exclusion",ten
negative rules have been laid down,which are applied in
all cases where the presence of the degree of invention
necessary to sustain a patent is called into question.
Rul e I.
ME]lE M E}{A I GAL SKI LI, I S T Ii.NI I ON.
This is a question of fact whtich in many cases involves
considerabl e dif'ficult;. lndeed,not unfrequently i t isB a
task requiringl the keenest discrimination to determine
wiere mere judqment and skill terminate and invention begins.
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Between the portions of these two domains that are well
defined there is a border land of some breadth within
which many improvements lie,seeminqly belonging as much to
one domain as tie other. Although it is the policy of the
law to reward inventors br civing them the fruit of their
productions for a limited time,vet on the other hand the
patent laws cannot be so construed as to restrict ingqenu-
ity in the common emplonnent of the people without becom-
ing intolerably burdensomerather than beneficial. The
application of this policv makes the attainment of a just
decision a very serious matterfor manv-inventions undoubt-
edly appear verv simple when completed. The idea underlying
most of the rreat inventions is easily comprehended. Today
a school-boy can understand the safety-lampthe steam engine
and even the telephonebut their authors were peerless in-
ventors nevertheless.
The leading case on this subject is Atlantic Works
v. Brady,-107 J.f.192. Brady had a patent for an improved
dredge-boat. The alleged invention consisted mainly in
attaching a screw (which the patentee called a umud-fan,)
to the bow of a propeller dredge-boat provided with tanks
for settling her in the water.It was operated by sinking
the boat until the screw or mud-fan came in Contct with
the mud or sand,whichyby the revolution of the screw,wa.s
thrown up and mingled with the current.The same results
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had previousl.V been attained by running similar boats
stern foremost. In the course of the opinionJustice Brad-
ley says:. OThe process of development in manufactures cre-
ates a constant demand for new appliances,which the skill
of ordinarv headworkmen and engineers is generallV adequate
to devise,and which indeed,are the natural and proper out-
growth of such development.Each step forward prepares the
way for the nextand each is usuallV taken by spontaneous
trials and attempts in a hundred different places.To grant
to a single party a monopoly of every slight advance made,
except vhere the exercise of inventionsomewhat above the
ordinary mechanical or engineering skillis distinctly
shown,is unjust in principle and injurious in its conse-
qu e nee s ."
The design of the patent laws is to reward those
who make some substantial discovery or inventionwhich adds
to our knowledge and makes a step in advance in the useful
arts.Such inventions are worthy of all favor.It was never
the object of those laws to grant a monopolV for every
trifling device,every shadow of a shade of an idea which
' ould naturallyv and spontaneously occur to any skilled
mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manuf'ac-
tures. Such an indiscriminate creation of exclu]sive privi-
legies tends ratber to obstruct than to stimulate invention
It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it
J
their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement
and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies ,
which enable them to lay a heavv tax upon the industr. of'
the contrV wTithout contributing anyth-ing to the real ad-
vancement of the arts.It embarasses the honest pursuit of
business with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens
and unknoiwn liabilities to law-suits and vexatious account-
ings for profits made in good faith,."
In the recentlv decided case of Schuyler Electric
Co. v. Electrical Supply Co.,62 Fed. 58 (1894),the same
question arose in an infringement suit based upon letters
patent for a circuit breaker for electric lamps.
The accompanying sketch wil] serve'
to illustrate the invention.
The only claim involved
was ,the firstwhich reads as fol-
lows: "The combinationin an
electric light switch,
Q of' a ratchet having
metallic projections
and insulating teeth in the in-
~tervals between the same and a
pawl or detent for engaging with the insulating teeth
when released from contact with the metallic projections,
Bps and for the purpose specified;1"
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Judge Coxein the course of his opinionuses the follow-
ing languaqe: *It will not be pretended that the inven-
tion is a fundamental one.The inventor concedes that his
invention consists only in mechanical details for effect-
ing improvements in circiiit breakers. The device of the
patent is an inffenious little contrivance for opening and
closing an incandescent electric lamp circuit.It is shown
as located in a lamp socket.Such an invention in any other
art would probably be entitled to little consideration,
but when the eourts have to deal with patents relating to
electricitV they are apt to regard with superstitious awe
the smallest contrivance with which that mVsterious force
is harnessed and set to work.Although this view of the
subject may be correct in many instancesit is thought
that it is hardl.y applicable to the case at bar.Snap-action
circuit breakersused in connection with alternating in-
sulating and conducting rmaterialwere old.So were switches
having a wiping contact and a turn in one direction only.
This being so,it certainly did not require a profound
knowledge of electrical science to produce the patented
structure~ n The patent was sustained but it was confined
both b v the prior art and its owrn language to the device
described.
Within a fortnight after the foregoing decision by
Judge. Coxea like question was decided in an opinion bv
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Chief Justice Fullerin Sargent v.Coovert,14 Sup.Ct.676.
The patent related to a device used upon rope halters. The
accompanying longitudinal sectionstudied in connection
with the description in the specification,will serve to
explain the contrivance.
"fwrepresents a thimble of anv suit-
able dimensions,provided on one side
with a nut or enlargement,a,having a
hole through it with female screw
.__ threads. The thimble,Ais fastened on
- -the rope at any desired place,by means
of a sharp pointed screw,O,xwhich
passes through the thimble at the nut,a, and the rope.This
screw is provided with a round eye,D, for the reception of
a snap hook."
In support of the defense of invaliditythe infring-
ers introduced a prior patent for an .improvement in cattle
tie' granted to one Wiard.The screw in the p~atent sued on,
,-as shown herewith,was sharpened,wliereas the end of the
screw in the Wiard patent was blunt.It appeared on the
trial that the Wiard socket as actually made and sold,had
a convex end. Each of these screws compressed the rope
within the socketbut the Covert screw,being sharpened,
penetrates further than the other. The Court was of opinion
'that the alleged improvement was such a one as would have
Occurred to any one practically interested in the subject,
and that it did not involve such an exercise of the inven-
tive faculty as entitled it to protection.0
The writer is unable to perceive any substantial,
practical difference between the previously stated rule
(ante p.9) and the second rule of Mr. ,VWalkerwhich is that
Rexcellence of workmanship is not invention. It would ap-
pear rather as an over-refinement of classification to at-
tempt to distinguish them in view of the indistinct line
of demarcation which exists.
Rulie I ].
SUBSTITUION OF !bATER1/hL8 I S LT LTh~h O
The case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,1l Howard 248,is usually
cited in support of this General subject. 'The improvement
claimed in the patent was the making of door knobs of clay
or porcelainfitted upon a shank in a common manner. It
was shown that knobs of clay or porcelainapart from the
particular application in handwere old,and that the mode
of fastening the shank into the cavity of the knob was old
when metallic knobs were used. In holdingj that patent to
be void,the Supreme Court,speakinq by Justice Nelson, said:
The difference is formal and destitute of ingyenuity or
invention.It may afford evidence of judfment and skill in
the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manu-
facture of the instrument for the purposes intendedbut
nothing more.#
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The recent case of Klein v. City of Seattle,63 Fed.702,
presents a like conclusion. What was claimed by Klein's
applicationand to be considered as protected by the pat-
ent,wmas a pin of iron or steelof suitable size and any
lengthwith an enlarged head of lead or any soft metal,
upon itwith a thread to fit the inside of the ordinary
glass insulatorswhich are made with a spiral groove for
screwing on to a screw head. The heads were cast upon the
ends of the pins by running molten lead into a mold while
the end of a pin is held therein. , firm union of the
lead to the iron was secured by roughing the pin end with
a chisel. The kind of pin most commonly in use is made of
wood with a thread on the end to hold the insulator; but
wooden pins are sometimes objectionable because they can-
not be made of sufficient strength without being of a size
that unfits them for use in many places. Judge Hanford said:
UNow,all that can be claimed as the invention in this case
is the combination consisting of the use of iron in place
of wood for a pin, and lead in place of rags,wood,or cement
for a filling,and the process of making a firm union of
the lead head and iron pin; now it is my opinion that
there is nothing in this that amoutnts to an inxvention.h
Howeverit is not to be laid down broadl. that the
use of one material in place of another in a manufactured
vendible article or a machinecan never be the subject of
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a patent. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood decides that the employ-
ment of one knotwn material in place of another is not
inventionif the result be only greater cheapness and dur-
ability of the product. But that is all, with the gradual
development of the patent law in the United States,four
well defined exceptions to the rule have been established.
(l) If the substitution involves a new mode of con-
structionit may amount to an invention.
This conclusion is attained in the case of Smith v.
Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co.,93 U..486. Justice Story,
in delivering the opinion of the Courtused the following
language: "If then the claim be read,is it should be ,in
connection with the preceding part of the specification,
and construed in the light of the explanation which that-
gives,the invention claimed and patented is "a set of ar-
tificial teeth as a new article of manufacture,consisting
of a plate of hard rubberwith teethor teeth and gums,
secured thereto in the manner described in the specifica-
tionby embedding the teeth and pins in a vulcanizable
compound,so that it shall surround them while it is in a
soft state,before it is vulcariized,and so that when it
has been vulcanized the teeth are firmly arid inseparably
secured in the vulcanite,and a tight joint is effected
between themthe whole constituting but one pIece" It is
evident this is much more than employing hard rubber to
per-form the functions that had been performed by other ma-
terialssuch as gold,silver,tin,platinrn,or gutta-percha.
V new product was the resultdiffering from all that had
preceded it,not merely in degree of usefulness and excel-
lencebut differing in kindhavinq new uses and propertiers.
It was capable of being perfectly fitted to the roof and
alveolar processes of the mouth. It was eas for the wearer
and favorable for perfect articulation. It was light and
elastic,Vet sufficiently strong and firm for the purpose
of mastication. It was unaffected by any chemical action
of the fluids of the mouth. Besides all thisthey were very
inexpensive as compared with other arrangements of artifi-
cial teeth. To us it seems not too much to say that all
these peculiarities are sufficient to warrant the conclus-
ion that the device wvas different in kind or species from
all other devices. We cannot resist the conviction that
devising and forminq such a manufactire bV such a process
and of such materials was invention. More was needed for
it than simply mechanical judgfment and good taste.J
(2) Aniother exception to the ru]le arises where the
substitution involves a, new mode of operation.
Thomson Meter Co. v. National Meter Co.,65 Fed.428
(Jan. 1895),illustrates this subject. This suit was brought
to restrain the infrinfielnent of letters patent for improve-
tnent in water metersissued to the National Meter Company,
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as assignee of Lewis 1-.rash. The -Aeter to which the Nash
piston was applied had a circular measuring( ch.amberwith
curved sides and conical endsand a flat or conical disc
pistonhaving a central ball bearinqf,to which piston a
wobbling motion was imparted by the flow of the water
through the meter chamber. A system of gear wheels and
dials on top of the meter case served to register the num-
ber of complete movements of the pistonand thus indicate
the quantity of water passed. Nutatinq discs were not un-
known before i1ash's inventionbut they had been made
wholly of hard rubber or wholly of metal. The objections
to the use of' a metallic piston was.,(1) its weightand
its resistance to the flow of waterin consequence of its
not operating as rapidly as would a piston made of lighter
material; (2) if made sufficiently thin to be light enough,
accuracy of measurement would be impaired; and (3) the
friction between metal and metal is greater than between
metal and rubber. The superior adaptation of hard rubber
for use in a water meter was also well known,but prior to
the invention of Nash, it bad the serious and apparently
insuperable detect of losing its resilience and shape by
temporary irifersion in hot water. Temporary imm°ersion in
hot water occasionallv arises wi..en the valve whici is be-
tween the meter and a steam boiler .gets out of order,and
there is an excessive back pressure. The effects of this
*accidental hot water" are to soften the hard rubber disc,
to impair and destroy its resilience,and to produce a rad-
ial expansion which causes its edges to jam against the
sides of tile meter chamber,so that the disc becomes warped
and is rendered usele~s. Nash's contrivance was the intro-
duction of a steel-wire ring embedded in the rubber near
the periphery of the disc,-reiatitely like the tire of a
wheel,-and this arrangement was found to effectually res-
train the radial expansion of the disc when immersed in
"accidental hot water",and prevent the jamming and distor-
tion of the disc. The validity of the patent was therefore
established. The court adde, "nor is the complainant's
piston only an aggregation of old parts. The metal and
rubber do not act independently,but co-operate in produc-
ing a new result,and this constitutes patentable invention.
(3) If the substitution results in the first success
in the artthe inventor will be entitled to the protection
of the patent laws.
f dison Electric Light Co. v. U.S. Rilectric Lighting
Go.,52 Fed. 300,decided by Judge Lacombe in 1892,is the
case wmich probably corresponds most exactly 211th this rule.
In that case tile validity of Thomas A. Edison's "filament
carbon burner" patent bias contested. In delivering tile
opinion of tile court,tle learned judge said:i Atihough all-
glass globes,with leading wires passing through the glass
21
and sealed into it,had been used before to preserve the
conditions of the interior of a chamber from the effects
of leakage at the jointsand although the prior artinclud-
ing the French patent,indicated that subdivision of the
electric light was to be obtained bV the use of burners of
high resistance and small radiating surface,and although
the pencils of carbon had been tried in imperfect vacua,
and found wantingit was inventionin viewu of the teaching
of the art as to the disintegration of carbon under the
action of an electric current,to still select that substance
as a suitable material from which to construct a burner
much more attenuated than had ever been used beforereduced
in size to the filamentary, form in which economy of con-
struction requires that it must be used in order to .avail
of the philosophy of high resistance and small radiating
surfaceand so to combine old elements that the disintegra-
tion due to. "air washing" should be practically eliminated
and the .burner thus become commercially stable. It is true
that carbon burners still break doAmthat the improvements
neither of Edison nor of other inventors have made them
absolutely stable,and inl a sense it may be said that Edison
only made them more stable than theyv were before; .that it
is a mere matter of degree. But the degree of difference
between carbons that lasted one hour and carbons that lasted
hundreds of hfoursseems to have been precisely the differ-
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ence between success and failureand the combination which
first achieved the result, 'long desired, sometimes sought
and never attained,11 is a patentable invention.
It is true that the combination and manipulation
which secured a practically perfect vacuun by heating the
burner wuhile the exhaust pump was at work,and subsequently
sealing the globe without introducing a foreign gasis set
by Edison in his French patent as a means of effecting
such a change in the condition of platinum as would permit
of its being raised to high temperatures without rupture,
cracking or diminution of weight by volitilization. But
the evidence shows that the platinum lamp did not achieve
success,and we think there was manifest invention in the
substitution of carbon freed from occluded gases.,and placed
in a nearly perfect vacuum. The change in material invol-
ved a reorganization of the lamp. Dispensing with the
thermal regulato.r,which was an essential part of the struc-
ture of the French patentit developed new properties in
the lamp by reason of the enormous differences between the
resistances and the melting points of the two materials; it
utilized the discoveryv of that cause ('air washing") of
the instability of carbon,which seemed to preclude the
hope of its future usefulness as an incandescent illumin-
ant. Finally and principally, by the substitution, there was
presented the complete coinbinationf elements,which for
the first time in the art produced a practical electric
light. We are of the opinion that on principle and under the
authorities such a substitution of material is invention,'
(4) A fourth exception is met with in cases where the
substitution changes both the purpose and the material.
This point is illustrated very clearly in Potts v.
Creager,15 Sup.Gt.194 (1895),where the complainants alleged
the infringement of their patent for a clay disintegrator.
The onlV difference between the patent in dispute and a prior
polislhing mfachinle,exhibited on the trial bV the defendants,
consisted in the substitution of bars of steel for glass
bars on the periphery of the cylinder~the provision of an
abutting surface in the form of a revolving rollerand then
the use of the machine for a totally distinct and different
purpose. Speaking through Justice Brown,the Supreme Court
said: 4As a result of the authorities upon this subjectit
-may be said that if the new use be so nearly analogous to
the former one that the applicability of the device to its
new use would occur to a person of ordinary mechanical skill,
it is only a case of double use; but if the relations between
them be remote,and especially if the use of the old device
produce a new result,it mayi at least involve an exercise of
the inventive faculty. Much,however,must still depend upon
the nature of the changes required to adapt the device to
its new use. Applying this test to the case under consid-
24
erationit* is manifest that,if the change from the glass
bars of the Creager wood e--hibit to the steel bars of the
Potts cvlinder was a mere change of material for the more
perfect accomplishment of the same workit would,within
the familiar rule of I[otchkiss v. Greenwoodnot involve
invention. Butnot only did the glass bars prove so brittle
in their use for polishing wood that theyj broke and were
discarded after half an hour's trialbut thev would un-
doubtecily have been wholly worthless for the new use for
which the Pottses required them. Not only did they discard
the glass barsand substitute others of steel,but they
snbstituted them for a purpose wholly different from that
for which they had been employed. Under such circumstances,
we have repeatedly held that a change of material was in-
vent io 2It
Rul e III.
CHANGE OF FOPM, SIZE-1, OR D]EGPEE, IS NOT INTENT IO] .
In Adams Electric Ry. Co. v. Lindell Ry,. Co.,68 , Fed.986
(1894),this rule is applied to electric street car motors.
In his opinion,the worthy judgfe refers to Edison's experi-
mental electric locomoti e operated at Menlo Park,INew Jer-
C
sey,inl 1880. It was a locomotive as distinguish~ed from a
passengfer car which may be moved by power within or without
it; but,in essential featu res,it was much the same as the
device of the complainant. Judge Hallett continues :'There
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was an electric motor geared to the driving axleand rest-
ing on a frame attached to the axle boxes. All kinds of
gearing for transmitting the power of the armature to the
driven axle were successively adopted,but the change from
one to another of such well-known appliances was not in
the way of modern invention. Some changes in the form of
the motor and the carrying frame were desirable,and proba-
blV necessary,to admit of mounting the body of a passenger
car on the Edison locomotiveand thus to change that vehicle
to the car of the present time,which carries its own motoT
But it is doubtful if there is anything like invention in
making such changes. A. motor consisting of many coils of
wire combined in a form suitable for an armature to revolve
rapidly in a frameand of other coils of wire combined in
a form suitable for a fixed magnet in another part of the
same framemay be built in any desired shape and size. The
matter of reducing the Edison apparatus of 1880 to a size
and shape which would admit of putting it under an ordinary
passenger car in conjunction with the car axle was no great
achievTement.." The patent was therefore held void for want
of invention.
In Union Paper Ba Mach. Co. v. Waterbury,58 Fed.566,
Judge Coxe says:. "One maker may s elect one form of fold,
another maker another form, and so on,but they are not in-
ventors if all accomplish,substantially, the same well-known
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result,the differences being of form only. The one who
first embodied the conception of a flat-bottomed bag capa-:
ble of being folded flat and easily distendedi into an un-
supported box was very likely entitled to rank as an inveln-
to. But after this had once been done it did not require
invention to change the shape or order of the folds,unless
some new or beneficial result was obtained. If a contrary
intention be maintained where is the court to stop? Where
shall the line be drawn? If invention resides in the mere
sequence of stepsas many patents may be granted as new
ways may be suqqested of folding the bar"
But there are exceptions to this rule alsoas,for
instancein cases in which form is of the essence of the
invention,and then change in form is change in substance.
Thus in Hppinger v. Richev, 14 Blatch.307,the Circuit Court
sustained a patent for a peculiar form of plug tobacco
that was shon to possess great advantages.
In Knickerbocker (o. v. Rogers,61 Fed.297,the patent-
ability of a dust collector was sustained. The dust collec-
tor was of the same greneral form as some pre-existing
spiral steam separators,with the exception of a change in
the form of the cone,and the relative size of the openings. f'
Rule IV.
METhE AGGPEGPAT I GIN I S INOT IMJEINT IO11N.
At an exhibition of railway appliances held in Chicago some
or.
years ago,the Philadelphia & Reading qRailroad Company pre-
sented a remarkably well constructed. locomotive. It had
the Wooten patent fire-box,an extension smoke-box, injectors
of the best typesteam driver-brakessteam reversingq gear,
and a ntumber of other features which being all embodied in
this locomotive,entitled the Company to a medal for exhib-
iting the locomotive which showed the greatest number of
improved modern railway appliances. Such a union of' parts,
howeverdid not entitle the Railroad CompanV to a patent.
Merely bringing old devices into juxtapositionand there
allowinq each to work out its orn effect without the pro-
duction of something novelis not invention.The extreme
cases of aggregation are easily distinguished.It is evi-
dently only an aggregation when an additional car is added
to a train of cars. The additional effect is equal to the
added causeand we are not confused because our purpose
could not be accomplished without the additional cair. An
aggregaation thus formed is clearly seen to be,to use the
language of Justice Matthews,"the mere adding together of
separate contributions.2
Ilailes V. Van Lormer,20 Wall.853,and PRoyer v. Potl,
18:1 fT.8. 20l,are cases illustrative rf this topic. The
former is the well-known B~ase-Burning Stove Case,in which
the patentee had made claim to a combination which includ-
ed the fire-potcoal-reservoir,revertible fluesdirect
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draft and i-lluminated openingsall of which sing(ly conosid-
ered were old,but their uniC.-on in one structure gave the
stove many desirable qualities. In Royer v. Roththe claim
of the patent Vas as follows:"In combination with the drum
A,of a rawhide fulli:ng machine operating to twist the lea-
ther alternately in one direction and the othera shifting
device for the purpose of making the operation automatic
and continuous substantially as desc ribed*" In both caise
there was but the a.ssemblinq of old devices,without the
exerciise of invention.And in Hailes-v. Van Wormer,if not
as obviously,fully as surely,as in the illustration of the
agqregation by the addition of the carto quote the lan-
quag e of Justiee Gray in leatinq Co, v. Burtis,121 U.8.289:
"Threre was no specific quality of the result which could
not be definitely assigned to the independent action of a
single elernent." In Royer v. Roth,the Court held that there
was no invention in the application of the shifting device
to a fulling maciine.
it is well settled that the action of the elements
need not be simultaneous. Judge Aceheson said in St utg .
Armstrong,2O Fed.847V' "I is by no means essential to a'
patentable combination,as the defendant's argument implies,
that the several devices or elements should coact upon
each other. It is sufficient if all the devices co-operate
with respect to the work to be doneand in furtherance
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thereof, although each device may perform its own particular
function onlV."
In IPolmes Burgla.r Alarm Co. v. Domestic Tel. Co.,42
Fed.226,Judge Wales makes use of the following languageo.
"The simultaneous co-operation of the parts is not essential
to a patentable combinationif the parts are so arranged
that the successive action of each contributes to produce
some one practical resultwhich resultwhen attainedis the
product of the simultaneous or successive action of all the
elementarV partsviewed as one entire vihole.The term, Co-
operation does not mean acting together or simultaneously,
but.unitedly to a eonrnon end.So here the electrical protec-
tion of the conductors is the result produced by the combi-
f
nation,and the two instruments guard the same line at the
same time. One instrument protects it from cuttingand the
other from short-circuiting. ,emove either instrument and
the result fails pro tanto. This result was usefuland never
before known. The des ign of the combination was to protect
the patented apparatus against the methods of disabling it
by tampering with the condu~ctors,as could be done with the
prior systems. The instruments co-operate in making glood
each other's deficiencies,and the arrangement of the con-
ductors is such that all their essential parts are brought
under the protection of the instr-ments."
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Rule V.
DUPLICATION OF PARTS IS NOT INVENTION.
The doctrine on this subject is so self-evident that the
Supreme.Court has been called upon to illustrate it in only
a few cases.
In Dumbar v. Myers,94 U.S.1.87,197,the subject mat-
ter was a circular saw mill having two deflector plates
behind the sawone on each side of it,to spread the two
parts of the lumber behind the saw so as to prevent the
lumber from binding against the faces of the saw and imped-
ing its progress. It had been old to have one such deflec-
tor plate behind the saw for the same purpose. It was shown
that in some cases benefit accrued from the use of two de-
flector platesland the circuit court sustained the patent.
But the Supreme Court reversed the decreeand declared the
claim which covered the additional plate to be void for
want of patentable invention.
Rul e VI.
TRE~ OMI SS ION OF ONE OR MORE' PARTS OF AN K ISTI4G THING DO)ES
NOT CONST ITUTE INMIERhT ION, UN LESS TM E OMI 5510O4 CAUSES A ,NEW
OP RPAT I ON OF T~tlE PART S RFJTA iID.
Stow v. Chicago,3 Banning & I rden 92,is the best il-
lustrative case upon this proposition. The patent in that
case covered a wood pavement like that of one Yficholson,
except that it omitted the board foundation and also the
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board strips of that earlier pavement. The circuit court
held that those omissions constituted no inventionsaying:
I A reconstruction of a machine so. that a. less number
of parts will perform all of the funictions of the greater,
may be invention of a high order; but the omission of a
part,with a corresponding omission in function,so that the
retained parts do just what they did before in the combi-
nationcannot be other than a mere matter of judgmentde-
pendiiig upon ,Thether it is desirable to have the machine
do all,or less,than it did before.0
But the patentee is entitled to protection where the
omission changes the mode of operation and turns a bad into
a good result. An illustration of this is presented in the
case of the Edison Electric Light Go. v. rJ.S.Electric Light-
ing Co.,52 Fed. 800,808,where the dispensing with the ther-
mp°l regulator which was an essential part of the structure
of the prior French patent for a platinum lamp,developed
new properties in the new lamp by reason of the enormous
differences between the resistances fnd the melting points
of the twro materials.
Rule I I.
IT IS USUA LIY WI!O Ii]Vl-t ]TIOi TO SUBSI3 TUTE I T AN OLID DEVICE
ONE ORt M ORE }4E01PIOA(I I EOUIXIALRNiTS FOP. OiNE OR] MOPE OF' ITS
PAR S. THETB SAME IS TP JE IN Cl (BMI CAL ;A-S T- EE A C}lThiMI GAL
EQUIVAL. EIT I 818UBSTITUTED,
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The doctrine of equivalei)ts usually arises in considering
the question of infrinqeement,and will be merely touched
upon in this thesis.
Speakinq of equivalents,Mr. Valkey says:"'he subject
is of double importance,because it relates sometimes to the
vralitiitv and. sometimes to the infringement of patents. A..
may construct and may patent a machine which differs from
the prior patented ITachine of C.D. -in one part only. If the
courts decide that t 1 e new part insertedis an equivalent
of the old part omitted,then the machine of A.B. will be an
infrinqement,and will not be an invention, If',on the other
hand.,the courts hold. that the part inserted is not such an
equi.valent,then the machine of A.B. ma, be an inventionand
will not be an infringement of anV claim covering the entire
machine of C.D. "
The termrequivalentO as used in patent law has two
meaninqs. The one relates to the results that are produced
and the other to the mechanism byv which those results are
produced.. Two thinqs mayv be equixialent~as producing the
same result,k.lhen thley are not the same mechanical means.
In Smi~th v. 1\Ucfols,21 mall. 119,the Supreme Court
says:RA mere carryvinqc forward o-r new or more extended appli-
cation of the ori Teal thought,a chan  only in formpro-
portionsor degreethe substitution of equivalentsdoinq
s-ubstantially the same thinr in the same ,.T8v by su bstantially
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the same means with better results,is not such invention
as will sustain a patent.."
To further illustrate this siibject,Consolidated Pied-
mont Cable Ry. Co., v. Pacific Cable Ry. Co.,53 Fed.385,and
George. Frost Co. v. Silvermann,62 Fed.64S-,may be cited.
In the former casethe device alleged to be infring-
ed by defendant was a clamp or grip for cable railwaysi*In
the plaintiff's machinethe pressure w, rhich secures the grip
of the cable is exerted through friction rollers; in the
defendant's machinethrough what was called in argument a
bell-crank. In the testimony it was assimilated by an ex-
pert witness to a toqle joint. If .it is either,it is an
equivalent. A, bell-crank is a T :Tell-knolwUf mechanical device,
and a toriqle joint was held an equivalent to exert pressure
of friction rollers by Judqe Tashington in Gray v. James*
In Frost Co. v. Silvermann,the complainant's patent
showed and described a qarter consisting of a strip of
elastic webbing1 extending partially around the linb,and
havingq its two ends connected by a loop of cord which ren-
ueret: freely t? roufh its connections-,ith the ends of the
pjebbing,anld attached to the loop was a clasp to h~Ol(i the
g.arm_):ent to be supporteI; the loop formed a conne6ction between
the clasp and the band of webbing, and a rendering, self-
adjusting connection between the ends of the webbing. The
only differences between it and defendant's garter were that,
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instead of a fibrous cord for con .ecting the two ends of
the webbingthe defendant's substituted a metallic chain,
composed of bead-like links flexibly connected with one an-
other,and their clasp was free to render upon this loop of
ciain,whereas in the patent drawing the clasp seemed to be
rigidly fixed to the ends of the cord."The latter feature,
howeverdoes not enter into the claim of the patent and it
is wholly immaterial to the desired result whether the clasp
is rigidly attached to the loop or renders thereon. Now,
cords and chainsas appears from the proofs (andas,indeed,
is comnonly known),are interchangeable mechanical equiva-
lents for a great variety of purposes. The change from a
fibrous cord to a flexible chain affects neither the form
of constructiongthe -mode of operationnor the result. The
chain loop performs the exact function that the cord loop
doesand in precisely the same way. This is a plain case of
equivalencv"
Rule VIII.
NEW? COM IINAT I ON, WIT}HOUT NEW MODE OF OPEPVT ION, I S NOT Iir-~
In the leading case of Pickering v. Mc Cullougfh,104
U.S810, 318,the Supreme O]ourt,speaking through Justice
Matthewssaid,-"In a patentable combination of old elements
all the constituents must so enter inte it as that each
qualifies every othier...It must form either a new machine
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of a distinct character and functionor produce a result
due to the joint and co-operating action of all the elements
and which is not the mere adding together of separate con-
tributions ."
In National Cash Register Co. v. American Cash Regis-
ter Co.,58 Fed":.87,the circuit court of appeals stated the
law on this point as folio-us:."A combination, to be patent-
able,must produce a new and useful result,as the product of
the combination,and not a mere aqrreqate of several results,
each the complete result of one of the combined elements;
there must be a new result produced by their unionw"
Burt v. Evory,138U.S.349, involved a patent for an im-
provement in boots and shoes,which was claimed to consist
of a novel mode of construction,whereby the ordinary elastic
orinqT at the sides of the shoes and the lacing up at the
front were both dispensed with,while at the same time the
tops expanded to receive the foot,and fitted neatly around
the anklebeing also water-tight to the extreme top of the
shoe. %3peakinq for the oGourtJustice Lamar said:"It is dif-
ficult to see anyv patentable device or fu]nction in the Evory~
shoe .lt is a mere aqgrecjation of old parts,with! only such
changes of form or arrangjement as a skillful mechanic could
readily devise,-the natural outqrowth of the development of
mechanical skill,as distinguished from invention.The changes
made by Evory and Heston in the construction of a water-
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tight shoe were changes of degree only, and id not involve
anv new principle. Their shoe performed no new functions
Other cases but repeat and illustrate this rule in
various ways. That the use of a combination in a different
machine does not change the combinationsee LaRue v.Western
Electric Co.,28 Fed.85; changes in the arranqement of the
elements do not change the combination unless they also
change its function or the function of an element,Phipps v.
Yost,26 Fed.441.
Rule IX.
USING AN OLD THINGW FOR A 'l'JE PURPOS.F I S USUALLY NOT INVENTIOIN'.
It is a general rule that if the prior device is a pat-
ented onethe patentee has the exclusive right to it for
all the uses to which it is applicable,no matter whether he
knew of those uses or notand no matter what the use for
which he deemed it specially applicable. Oases of this kind
come under the head of what is known to the patent law as
"double use" which is to be distinquished from what is call-
ed, "Tew use"
Merwin,in his work on "Patentability of Inventions",
says: ,"Strictly speaking,a _nlkW us is a use different from
that with which it is compared,-different in the sense that
invention was required to reach it,and therefore it is pat-
entable,-wlereas a dQuble .jas it is called,is a second
employment of some process or contrivance so like to the
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previous emplofment of it,that,riven the first,inventive
(Tenius was niot needed to attain the second -- the skill of
the worlonan was sufficient for that purpose. The second
usetherefore,is not patentable,."
in St. (Termlain v. Brunswick,185 U.8.280,(a case upon
a patent for a revolvinq cue-rack) Chief Justice Fuller,
speaking for the Gourtsaid:, This case falls within the
familiar rule that the application of an old process or
machine or apparatus to a similar or analogous subject,with
no change in the manner of application,and no result sub--
stantially distinct in its nature,will not sustain a patent
although the new form of result may not have before been
contemplated. . . . As the revolving rack held the cues in
the same way and by the same means as the ordinary rackif
patentable novelty existed at all it must be found in mak-
ing the racks revolvewhen constructed and operating in
the manner stated. But revolving contrivances,such as table
casters and the likefor the reception and carriage of ar-
ticles,so as to bring them within easy reach,were well-
known,and the application of such contrivances to the hold-
ing and carrying of cues wras but the application of an old
device to a new arid analogous use, with s uch chang es only
as would naturally be made to adapt it thereto,"
In Smith v. Partridge, 42 Fed.57,it was held that
where the uses are precisely similar,and the one device sug-
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Qests the otherthe tact that the anticipating device was
applied to regulate thie vanes of windinillswhile the one in
question wacs applied to fans for ventilationwhich belonged
to a different department of artdoes not prevent the two
devices from being analoqous.
In Cahoone Barnet Mfg. Cqo. v.Rubber Harness 00.45
Fed.582,this doctrine was applied to design patents. The
circuit court,comparinq desigl patents and patents for in-
ventions,said:"In boththe final production must have been
engendered by the exercise of brain powerand to such an
extent that it maV be said to be born of genius. If this be
correctit follows necessarilyV that the adaptation of old
devicesor of old forms or designs,though never so beautifu
to new purposes or ornamentationshowever exquisite the re-
sult is not invention. It is not begotten of originality.
And so it is forbidden for one to choose an existing design
simply devote it to a new use,and,because of such new use,
successfullv to claim the benefits of the patent laws,.
Pvn exception to this general rule arises in the eases
where the new use is nlot nearly analogous to the old use.
Potts v. Oreagjer,l5 Sup.(Ot.194,cited under rule II.,4,is an
illustrative case on1 this point.
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Rule K..
DOU fEVS LJ I IPffI ,T TO P},'S.1TC.T. OF i Q Ti-iTi MAY BE SOLVED BY
SHOWING SUPERIOR UTILITY AND GIN2 I JAL PUBLIC USE; OR BY i IE-
C(ESSPITY OR NON.- 1 JECESSITY FOR EXPERIMENTS.
The precedinT nine rules will in most cases suffice
to determine the presence or absence of invention; but where
the question is still in doubt,the fact that the device has
gone into general use,and displaced other devices emplo yed
for a similar purpose is usually regarded as sufficient to
turn the scale in favor of the invention.
The leading case on this subject is Smith v. Goodyear
Dental Vulcanite Co.,93 U.8.495,where it is saidO"We do not
say the single fact that a device has gone into qeneral u-s,
and has displaced other devices which had previously been
employed for analogous uses,establishes in all cases that
the later device involves a patentable invention. It may,
however,alviays be considered,and when the facts.in the ease
leave the question in doubt,it is sufficient to turn the
scal.e.
The test embodied in the foregoing rule was a perfectly
satisfactory one in Stahl v. XWilliams,64 Fed.121,where the
court said:'"the rival incubators were operated side by side
at the county fairand the practical farmer could count the
eggs and hatching chickensand reduce the question of com-
parative utility to a mere mathematical exercise."
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OccasionallyThowevera case arises in which the weakness
of the test is shown with .great clearness. For instance,
one man mayjbV the adoption of an alluring trade-mark
succeed in catching the eye of the people,and palming off
upon them wares of no greater intrinsic value than those
of his rivals. Then againenormous sales may follow from
the more attractive appearance or the more perfect finish
of the articlefrom more extensive and judicious advertis-
ing,larger discounts to the trade,or greater energ.y in
pushing sales.There aretherefore,a l'arge number of other
considerations than that of invention entering into a
question of this kind,which render the popularity of the
article an unsafe criterion.
